

UKRAINE'S POSTWAR FUTURE

REPORT ACCORDING TO THE SURVEY RESULTS



TRANSITION

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic

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Authors: Denys Kobzin, Andriy Chernousov, Svitlana Shcherban.

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GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCH

Purpose: to research the ways of contribution to consensus in the society after the end of the war with the victory of Ukraine.

Geography: Ukraine, except temporarily occupied territories, in particular also the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. For comfortable sampling realization and further analysis the territory of Ukraine is divided into 6 nominal macro regions — the Centre (Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Cherkassy regions), the North (Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv regions), the East (Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions, as well as separate districts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia regions), the West (Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Chernivtsi regions), the South (Mykolaiv, Odesa, separate districts of Kherson regions), city of Kyiv.

Volume of the realized sample: 3,018 participants.

Period of realization: data collection took place from 05.11.2022 until 24.11.2022

Methodology: Standardized quantitative questioning by method of personal interviews (face-to-face) at the participants' place of living (in-flat questioning) with use of tablets (TAPI — Tablet Assisted Personal Interviewing) with special software for sociological questionings Lemur.

Sample design: The sample is proportionally stratified by the indicators of «macro regions» (the Centre / the North / the East / the West / the South / city of Kyiv) and «type of inhabited areas» (regional centres / other cities and settlements of city type / villages) in each separate macro region. Statistical data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine as of the end of 2021 were used for this with taking into account internally displaced people according to the report of International Organization for Migration¹.

Stochastic sampling of the inhabited areas (clusters) from the list of all inhabited areas of each strata with taking into account the clusters' size (number of the inhabitants of the inhabited areas) has been made, i.e. PPS (Probability Proportional to Size) sampling. Stochastic sampling of the initial addresses for the use of the itinerary sample has been made.

Quotas of sex and age for sampling of participants in households have been counted. So, this sample is three-leveled, combined – probability one at the level of selection of inhabited areas and initial addresses for the questioning itineraries, with quota screening at the level of participants' selection in households. In general, the sample represents the adult population of Ukraine (18 years old and older). The statistical margin of error with probability of 0.95 does not exceed 2% for one-dimensional distributions of all the people polled².

1. Ukraine Internal Displacement Report. General population survey. round 8 (23 August 2022):

https://displacement.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11461/files/reports/IOM_Gen%20Pop%20Report_R8_ENG_updated%20logo%20%281%29.pdf

2. Theoretical margin of error without taking into account the sampling design-effect

INFORMATION ABOUT THE PEOPLE POLLED

The distribution of the people polled by sex and age, as well as the distributions by regions of living of the participants (by macro regions) and type of the inhabited area simulate the proportions of the whole general population, i.e. of the whole adult population of Ukraine according to the data of the state statistics. More than a half of the people polled are exclusively Ukrainian-speaking, one-third are bilingual (they use both the Ukrainian and Russian languages). The biggest part of the people polled by their material state are either low-income individuals (they have enough just for food), or middle-income individuals (they have enough for life, except for purchase of expensive things) [Table A].

Among the people polled 18% are IDP, 46% have IDP relatives and friends, 12% took part in military actions or lost relatives in military actions, 7% have their dwelling ruined or broken due to the war [Picture A].


Table A. Social and demographical characteristics of participants (N, %)

SEX	Male	1,364	45%
	Female	1,654	55%
AGE GROUPS	18-29 y.o.	489	16%
	30-44 y.o.	883	29%
	45-59 y.o.	765	26%
	60 y.o. and older	881	29%
REGION OF RESIDENCE	Centre	512	17%
	North	556	18%
	East	585	19%
	West	957	32%
	South	268	9%
	City of Kyiv	140	5%
INHABITED AREA TYPE	Regional centre	1,000	33%
	Town in the region	831	28%
	Urban-type settlement, village, settlement	1,187	39%
LANGUAGE OF COMMUNICATION	Exclusively Ukrainian	1,674	55%
	Exclusively Russian	306	10%
	Ukrainian and Russian	1,017	34%
	Another language	21	1%

Table A. Social and demographical characteristics of participants (N, %)

MATERIAL STATE		
We hardly make both ends meet, sometimes we don't have enough money for food	466	15%
We have enough for food, but purchase of clothes or shoes is difficult	856	28%
In general, we have enough for life, but not for precious things (furniture, refrigerator etc.)	1,117	37%
We don't have financial difficulties, except for big purchases (dwelling, an expensive car etc.)	347	12%
We don't have any financial difficulties, we can afford practically everything	124	4%
Refused to answer	108	4%

Picture A. Some facts from the life of the people polled (%)



Base: all the people polled — 3,018


CHAPTER 1

EXPECTATIONS CONCERNING THE END OF THE WAR

Absolute majority of Ukrainians (89%) have no doubts concerning the return of all the temporarily occupied territories under control of Ukraine, in general 95% consider it possible [Picture 1.1]. Such attitudes have nothing to do with social and demographical characteristics of the participants (sex, age, place of residence etc.).

Picture 1.1. Chances of the return of the temporarily occupied territories under control of Ukraine (%)

Q: «Do you consider possible the return of the temporarily occupied territories under control of Ukraine?»




Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Also, there is a rather unanimous opinion that for the sake of the end of the war Ukraine does not have to accept any compromises, either concerning the lose of territories, or concerning the membership in NATO, or concerning the European integration, or concerning the status of the Russian language etc [Picture 1.2].

Picture 1.2. Possible compromises for the sake of the end of the war (%)

Q: «Which compromises, in your opinion, can Ukraine accept for the sake of the end of the war?»



The participants could choose several variants of the answer, that's why the sum of all the answers exceeds 100%


Base: all the people polled — 3,018

The majority of Ukrainians will consider the victory in the war over the Russian aggressor the return to the borders of 1991, i.e. together with the temporarily occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as with the Crimea. For noticeable number of Ukrainians, the recognized leadership of Ukraine in the Eastern Europe will become the victory in the war [Picture 1.3]. And the answers for this question are also very harmonious.

The return of the Crimea is an important part of Ukraine's victory, because the occupation of the peninsula is taken by the majority of Ukrainians (84%) as a part of the war with Russia that continues [Picture 1.4].

Picture 1.3. Expectations concerning the victory of Ukraine in the war (%)


Q: «What does the victory for Ukraine in the war mean for you?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Picture 1.4. Is the temporary occupation of the Crimea a part of the war with Russia (%)

Q: «Do you think that the temporary occupation of the Crimea is a part of the war with Russia?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018

CHAPTER 2


RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE INHABITANTS OF THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (85%) consider that it is worth keeping in touch with the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine [Picture 2.1].

Division for this question is almost the same in different social and demographical groups of the participants of the survey.

Picture 2.1. Is it worth keeping in touch with the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories (%)

Q: «Does Ukraine have to keep in touch with the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018


In general, the attitude to the Russian citizenship of the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories is rather tolerant. The significant part of the people polled do not recognize it a citizenship and accordingly propose to ignore these «papers». Many of them are ready to justify the receipt of Russian passports, if it was done forcedly, for the sake of survival in the conditions of the temporary occupation. Comparatively small number of the people polled (14%) consider it a crime that previews punishment. In particular, they take so the receipt of the citizenship of the RF as by the inhabitants of the territories that were temporarily occupied after February 24, 2022, so by the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied in 2014 Crimea [Picture 2.2].

The opinion that the Russian citizenship received on the temporarily occupied territories and in the Crimea is not worth at all recognition as a citizenship is somehow more popular in the western, central and northern regions of Ukraine. As for the bigger defense, Ukrainians with Russian passports can hear it in the East, South and in Kyiv. However, despite of some discrepancies, these two positions are dominant in any part of Ukraine [Tables 2.1–2.2].

Picture 2.2. Attitude to the Russian citizenship of some inhabitants of the temporarily occupied after February, 24 territories of Ukraine and the Crimea (%)

Q: «What is your attitude to the Russian citizenship received by the inhabitants of the territories temporarily occupied after the beginning of the full-scale aggression? What is your attitude to the Russian citizenship received in the temporarily occupied Crimea?»

ATTITUDE TO THE RUSSIAN CITIZENSHIP RECEIVED



Base: all the people polled
— 3,018

Table 2.1. Attitude to the Russian citizenship of some inhabitants of the temporarily occupied after February 24 territories of Ukraine, depending on the region of residence of the participants (%)

Q: «What is your attitude to the Russian citizenship received by the inhabitants of the territories temporarily occupied after the beginning of the full-scale aggression?»

	REGION					
	Centre	West	North	East	South	City of Kyiv
I don't recognize it a citizenship	45	42	37	33	28	27
I treat it with understanding, if it helps people survive	39	32	37	47	49	57
It is a crime; those who receive the passport shall be punished	11	16	17	11	11	12
I don't care	3	3	3	4	6	2
Difficult to say	2	7	6	5	6	2

Base: Ukrainians that live in different regions of Ukraine, in particular in the Centre — 512, in the North — 556, in the East — 585, in the West— 957, in the South — 268, in the city of Kyiv — 140

Table 2.2. Attitude to the Russian citizenship of some inhabitants of the Crimea, depending on the region of residence of the participants (%)

Q: «What is your attitude to the Russian citizenship received in the temporarily occupied Crimea?»

	REGION					
	Centre	West	North	East	City of Kyiv	South
I don't recognize it a citizenship	50	47	43	35	34	29
I treat it with understanding, if it helps people survive	30	27	27	44	39	42
It is a crime; those who receive the passport shall be punished	11	16	16	10	19	14
I don't care	4	3	4	6	1	6
Difficult to say	5	7	10	5	7	9

Base: Ukrainians that live in different regions of Ukraine, in particular in the Centre — 512, in the North — 556, in the East — 585, in the West— 957, in the South — 268, in the city of Kyiv — 140

CHAPTER 3

FUTURE DESTINY OF THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES


The law «About changes to some legal acts (about imposition of the criminal responsibility for the collaboration activity)» came into effect in Ukraine on March 14. According to this law, for carrying out of the household activity in interaction with representatives of the state-aggressor there is a criminal punishment from 170 thousand hryvnias to imprisonment for the period up to 5 years. This law also defines the notion of «collaboration». In particular, collaboration is actions directed at public negation by a citizen of Ukraine of the armed aggression against the state, establishment and assertion of the temporary occupation of the part of the territory of Ukraine or public calls by this citizen, in particular to support of decisions and/or actions of the state-aggressor, the armed formations and/or occupational administration of the state-aggressor, cooperation with the state-aggressor, the armed formations and/or the occupational administration of the state-aggressor, non-recognition of the spread of the state sovereignty of Ukraine over the temporarily occupied territories.

On August 5, 2022 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the draft laws worked out by the Ministry on Reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories that are aimed at clarification of the issues of criminal responsibility for collaboration. The clarification was necessary because formally people that anyway don't make harm to Ukraine, but are obliged to work in order to feed their families and support the life activity of their community: for example, cure the ill people or provide the work of the objects of critical infrastructure, could go under criminal responsibility. The approved draft laws were passed for consideration of the Verkhovna Rada.

So, the participants of the survey also have an opinion, for which special actions the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories shall be drawn to criminal responsibility, i.e. who shall be considered collaborators. First of all, these are participants of illegal armed formations, combatants, especially those who made severe crimes. Also, these are leaders and other workers of the occupational power authorities. The opinion that all the average citizens who cooperated during the temporary occupation with the local authorities shall be punished is not quite popular, only 28% of participants think like this [Picture 3.1]. The participants had an opportunity to show more certain opinions concerning the responsibility and legal consequences for collaborators in their answers to the next question [Picture 3.2]. The proposition concerning criminal conviction of those who cooperated with the occupants is supported the most. Collaborators who worked, first of all at the leading posts, in the occupational power authorities shall be refused of the right to take some positions. Besides, an opinion that real collaborators have to pass a procedure of confirmation of the citizenship of Ukraine is rather popular. However, somehow another opinion is given almost by one-third of the people polled: there shall not be any restriction of the rights for these people, because life in temporary occupation is not a crime by itself, so average citizens shall not be punished for this.

Picture 3.1. Criminal responsibility for collaboration (%)

Q: «There are different opinions, who shall bear criminal responsibility for cooperation with the occupational power authorities. And what is your opinion, who shall bear criminal responsibility?»



The participants could choose several variants of the answer, that's why the sum of all the answers exceeds 100%

Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Picture 3.2. Legal consequences for the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories (%)

Q: «Shall the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories be restricted in their rights after the return of these territories under control of Ukraine?»



The participants could choose several variants of the answer, that's why the sum of all the answers exceeds 100%

Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Concerning the fact how justice shall take place on the de-occupied territories of Ukraine, there exist two most spread opinions – either this is only internal legal issues of the Ukrainian state, or the issues shall be considered by Ukrainian judges, but with involvement of international specialists [Picture 3.3]. There are some discrepancies in the answers of the inhabitants of different regions. For example, the idea of the international tribunal has the biggest support of the inhabitants of Kyiv, and the wish to stay within the boundaries of Ukrainian legislation – in the South and West [Table 3.1].

Picture 3.3. Justice on the de-occupied territories (%)

Q: «How, in your opinion, shall justice on the de-occupied territories take place?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Table 3.1. Justice on the de-occupied territories, depending on the region of residence of the participants (%)

Q: «How, in your opinion, shall justice on the de-occupied territories take place?»


	REGION					
	City of Kyiv	Centre	East	North	West	South
Within current legislation of Ukraine	34	41	43	43	48	49
In Ukrainian courts, but with involvement of international specialists	34	39	34	35	28	24
With assistance of the international tribunal	21	13	13	15	14	16
With help of creation of a new body of judicial proceeding	8	4	6	3	4	4
Own variant	3	3	4	4	6	7

Base: Ukrainians that live in different regions of Ukraine, in particular in the Centre — 512, in the North — 556, in the East — 585, in the West— 957, in the South — 268, in the city of Kyiv — 140

There are different opinions concerning the best methods of administration on the de-occupied territories. The most popular proposition is managing with assistance of military-civil or military administrations [Picture 3.4]. However, concerning the administration in the de-occupied Crimea the opinions divided, a little bit more voices are for keeping by the peninsula of the status of autonomy [Picture 3.5]. No essential discrepancies can be seen concerning these issues in different social and demographical groups.

Picture 3.4. Administration on the de-occupied territories (%)


Q: «How, in your opinion, shall the administration on the de-occupied territories take place?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Picture 3.5. Administration on the de-occupied territory of the Crimea (%)

Q: «How, in your opinion, shall the administration of the de-occupied territory of the Crimea take place?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018

CHAPTER 4


POSSIBLE PLOTS OF THE POSTWAR PUBLIC COMPREHENSION

The participants in general assess rather positively the perspectives of the postwar public comprehension between different groups of Ukrainians — between military and civilians, displaced people and local inhabitants, migrants to other countries and those who stayed in Ukraine, Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking ones. The biggest fears concerning possible conflicts exist on the language ground, but even in this case only 82% of the people polled indicate that relationships between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking will stay good or at least satisfactory [Picture 4.1].

So, the probability of non-comprehension on the language ground caused certain discrepancies in the answers of the participants who communicate in Ukrainian and / or Russian, also of the inhabitants of different regions, on which the map of distribution of language practices is put. In particular, this question is seen as comparatively more conflict only the Ukrainian-speaking participants, and, accordingly the inhabitants of the western regions of Ukraine [Table 4.1].

Picture 4.1. Forecast of relationships between different groups of population in postwar Ukraine (%)

Q: «In your opinion, what will relationships between different groups of population be after the end of the war?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Table 4.1. Forecast of relationships between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking, depending on the age and region of residence of the participants (%)

Q: «What will the relationships be between those who communicate in Ukrainian and those who communicate in Russian?»

	LANGUAGE OF COMMUNICATION			REGION					
	Ukrainian	Russian	Both languages	West	Centre	South	North	East	City of Kyiv
Good + very good	36	61	63	26	51	58	55	63	66
Satisfactory	39	30	30	42	36	29	33	29	28
Bad + very bad	25	9	7	32	13	13	12	8	6


Base: Ukrainians by languages of communication, in particular those who communicate exclusively in Ukrainian — 1,674, exclusively in Russian — 306, in both languages — 1,017; Ukrainians that live in different regions of Ukraine, in particular in the Centre — 512, in the North — 556, in the East — 585, in the West— 957, in the South — 268, in the city of Kyiv — 140

In particular, attitude of Ukrainians who stay in the country to their co-citizens who went abroad from the beginning of the war is positive in general, if it deals with a forced movement of women, children, elderly people, as the majority of the people polled treats this with comprehension. However, every fifth participant thinks that the decision about leaving the country is an inalienable right of each citizen of Ukraine [Picture 4.2].

So, leaving of Ukrainians abroad is almost not blamed by anyone, so it is not probable that it will become the source of miscomprehension between Ukrainians after the war.

Picture 4.2. Attitude to co-citizens who went abroad with the beginning of the war (%)

Q: «What is your attitude towards Ukrainians who went abroad after the beginning of the war?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018


Ukrainians' attitude towards the power has always been rather critical, so it is very untypical to watch that the attitude to the bodies of the state power, according to the participants' words, has become noticeably better from the beginning of the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine (46%) or at least it has not become worse (40%) [Picture 4.3].

Let's indicate that improvement of attitude towards the bodies of the state power has taken place in all social and demographical groups, but it is somehow more noticeable among young Ukrainians. The attitude towards the power has changed almost in the same way in all regions of the country, except the South, where the participants said comparatively more often about the worsening and more rarely about the improvement of their attitude towards the power during the last year [Table 4.2].

Together with this, the attitude of Ukrainians towards Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy was rather loyal before the war, but now we can see its essential worsening —59% of Ukrainians say so. 40% have not changed their attitude towards Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy. [Picture 4.4]. Elderly Ukrainians (60 years old and older) say somehow more often about the worsening of their attitude. The inhabitants of the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine have comparatively more often kept their pre-war attitude towards Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy in comparison with the inhabitants of other regions [Table 4.3].

Picture 4.3. Dynamics of the attitude towards the bodies of the state power of Ukraine (%)

Q: «Has your attitude towards the bodies of the state power in Ukraine changed after the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Table 4.2. Dynamics of the attitude towards the bodies of the state power of Ukraine, depending on the age and regions of residence of the participants (%)


Q: «Has your attitude towards the bodies of the state power in Ukraine changed after the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine?»

	AGE				REGION					
	18-29 years	30-44 years	45-59 years	60+ years	West	East	City of Kyiv	North	Centre	South
It has improved	54	49	42	43	46	50	51	49	45	34
It hasn't changed	38	39	43	41	44	38	36	38	39	42
It has worsened	8	12	15	16	10	12	13	13	16	24

Base: Ukrainians of different age, in particular 18-29 years — 489, 30-44 years — 883, 45-59 years — 765, 60 years and older — 881; Ukrainians that live in different regions of Ukraine, in particular in the Centre — 512, in the North — 556, in the East — 585, in the West— 957, in the South — 268, in the city of Kyiv — 140

Picture 4.4. Dynamics of the attitude towards Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy (%)

Q: «How has your attitude towards Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy changed after the beginning of the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Table 4.3. Dynamics of the attitude towards Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy, depending on the age and regions of residence of the participants (%)

Q: «How has your attitude towards Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy changed after the beginning of the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine?»

	AGE				REGION					
	18-29 years	30-44 years	45-59 years	60+ years	South	East	Centre	North	City of Kyiv	West
It has improved	1	2	1	1	3	1	1	1	0	2
It hasn't changed	48	42	40	34	56	50	40	38	39	30
It has worsened	51	56	59	65	41	49	59	61	61	68

Base: Ukrainians of different age, in particular 18-29 years — 489, 30-44 years — 883, 45-59 years — 765, 60 years and older — 881; Ukrainians that live in different regions of Ukraine, in particular in the Centre — 512, in the North — 556, in the East — 585, in the West— 957, in the South — 268, in the city of Kyiv — 140


CHAPTER 5

PERSPECTIVES OF THE POSTWAR RENOVATION OF UKRAINE

The obstacles in the postwar renovation of Ukraine which Ukrainians will face after the war will be, first of all, the consequences of this terrible war — a huge amount of the people suffered and broken infrastructure of the country, as well as economical difficulties with filling of the budget and the corruption. The rest of the problems do not seem threatening in the same way [Picture 5.1]. The answers for this question in different social and demographical groups have almost the same division.

Picture 5.1. Possible obstacles in the postwar renovation of Ukraine (%)

Q: «What, in your opinion, will be the biggest obstacle for Ukraine after the end of the war?»



The participants could choose several variants of the answer, that's why the sum of all the answers exceeds 100%

Base: all the people polled — 3,018

CHAPTER 6


NEEDS OF UKRAINIANS IN AID IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR

In spite of all the horrors of the war time, comparatively small number of Ukrainians (15%) today acknowledge and say sincerely about their needs in psychological aid [Picture 6.1].

We can say that about all ranges of population, having just noticed that need in psychological aid is somehow lower in the young people (18-29 years), and also somehow different level of this need can be seen in different regions of Ukraine [Table 6.1].

Picture 6.1. Need in psychological aid (%)

Q: «Do you need psychological aid due to the war in Ukraine?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Table 6.1. Need in psychological aid, depending on the age and region of residence of the participants (%)

Q: «Do you need psychological aid due to the war in Ukraine?»

	AGE				REGION					
	18-29 years	30-44 years	45-59 years	60+ years	South	West	Centre	City of Kyiv	North	East
They need	11	15	16	17	9	13	14	14	17	19
They don't need	89	84	82	82	90	86	85	84	81	80
Difficult to answer	<1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1

Base: Ukrainians of different age, in particular 18-29 years — 489, 30-44 years — 883, 45-59 years — 765, 60 years and older — 881; Ukrainians that live in different regions of Ukraine, in particular in the Centre — 512, in the North — 556, in the East — 585, in the West— 957, in the South — 268, in the city of Kyiv — 140


28% of Ukrainians need humanitarian aid now [Picture 6.2].

It is evident that first of all the poorest ranges of population need this aid. Among the poor who don't always have enough finance even for food, 67% need humanitarian aid, and among those with low income who have enough finance only for food — 35%. Elderly people have bigger needs in humanitarian aid.

There is a comparatively small demand for humanitarian aid in the West of Ukraine, and the biggest demand is in the East [Table6.2].

Picture 6.2. Need in humanitarian aid (%)

Q: «Do you need humanitarian aid due to the war in Ukraine?»



Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Table 6.2. Need in humanitarian aid, depending on the age and region of residence of the participants (%)

Q: «Do you need humanitarian aid due to the war in Ukraine?»

	AGE				REGION					
	18-29 years	30-44 years	45-59 years	60+ years	West	North	City of Kyiv	Centre	South	East
They need	14	24	30	36	16	26	30	30	34	44
They don't need	86	75	69	63	84	74	70	69	65	55
Difficult to answer	0	1	1	1	<1	<1	0	1	1	1

Base: Ukrainians of different age, in particular 18-29 years — 489, 30-44 years — 883, 45-59 years — 765, 60 years and older — 881; Ukrainians that live in different regions of Ukraine, in particular in the Centre — 512, in the North — 556, in the East — 585, in the West— 957, in the South — 268, in the city of Kyiv— 140


CHAPTER 7

SOURCES AND INFORMATIONAL NEEDS OF UKRAINIANS

The main sources of news and information about the war are television and internet-resources, in particular social networks, news websites, messengers, Youtube [Picture 7.1]. The choice of the sources of information significantly depends on the age — the biggest part of users of the traditional media (television, printed newspapers, radio etc.) can be seen among the elderly Ukrainians (60 years old and older), altogether with the age the part of internet-users decreases, especially noticeably — of users of social networks and messengers [Table 7.1].

Picture 7.1. Sources of news and information about the war (%)

Q: «What sources do you receive the information about the war from?»



The participants could choose several variants of the answer, that's why the sum of all the answers exceeds 100%

Base: all the people polled — 3,018

Table 7.1. Sources of news and information about the war, depending on the age of the participants


Q: «What sources do you receive the information about the war from?»

	AGE			
	18-29 years	30-44 years	45-59 years	60+ years
Television	29	35	47	71
Social networks	58	56	48	32
News websites on the Internet	45	51	49	37
Channels, newsletters in messengers	57	53	39	23
Youtube	41	38	38	28
Official pages of the state bodies of power	34	32	26	15
Friends, relatives	20	20	21	22
Bloggers	12	9	9	6
Radio	4	6	9	13
Newspapers	4	3	6	11
Scientists	2	2	3	2
Church, spiritual meetings	0	1	2	2
Other	2	2	1	1
I am not interested	0	1	1	1

Base: Ukrainians of different age, in particular 18-29 years — 489, 30-44 years — 883, 45-59 years — 765, 60 years and older — 881

Picture 7.2. Needs in information about the temporarily occupied territories (%)

Q: «What information about the temporarily occupied territories would you like to learn?»



The participants could choose several variants of the answer, that's why the sum of all the answers exceeds 100%

Base: all the people polled — 3,018

■ MAIN CONCLUSIONS

- Ukrainians see the end of the war as unconditional victory of Ukraine, return of all the temporarily occupied territories together with the Crimea, restoration of the borders of 1991, without any compromises with the enemy. These are stable moods, on the boundary of certainty.
- Ukrainians that stayed on the temporarily occupied territories, in particular also those who live on the temporarily occupied from 2014 territories of Donbas and the Crimea are not taken antagonistically. It is worth keeping in touch with them. And even receipt of Russian passports as a way to survive in the conditions of occupation is taken with comprehension by a big part of Ukrainians that stay on the free territories. Open collaboration shall be punished; first of all it concerns combatants and collaborators, especially leaders, bodies of the occupational power. Justice shall take place in Ukrainian courts, but participation of international specialists or holding of the international tribunal are not excluded. The idea about general restriction of rights for the population of these territories after the de-occupation is not supported.
- We can notice a high level of solidarity, unity of Ukrainians in these horrible times. Postwar conflicts and civil miscomprehension between different categories of Ukrainians are not taken as probable scenarios. The indicator of unity is also a significant improvement of the attitude towards the state Ukrainian power. Unless there is some tension in the language issue — attitude towards the Russian-speaking in Ukraine. It is felt the most among those who do not use Russian in their everyday life, among the inhabitants of the western regions of Ukraine.
- After the victory Ukraine has to overcome the consequences of the war, but beside the ruins, damages and losses themselves, corruption will also be an obstacle for the restoration of the country. This problem is understood and taken as a serious challenge.
- Ukrainians lack information about their co-citizens on the temporarily occupied territories, about the plans of return of these territories and peacemaking, about the consequences of de-occupation etc. The best platforms for discussion of these topics are television, social networks, channels and publics in messengers.